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In Tribute
By FREDERIC L. KIRGIS*
When I was a Boalt Hall student in the late 1950s, I took Credi-
tors' Rights-not International Law-from Stefan Riesenfeld. Of
course, he was not "Stefan" or "Steve" to me then; he was Professor
Riesenfeld or (occasionally) Herr Professor Riesenfeld. It was incon-
ceivable that I would ever actually converse with him except as a stu-
dent sitting at his knee, trying in vain to understand the nuances of his
thought.
His thought, in fact, reflected and still reflects an amazing range
of interests and areas of expertise. How many international law schol-
ars are authorities in such bread-and-butter fields as creditors' rights?
How many legal scholars with a world view interest themselves in the
private law of a single state of the United States, such as creditors'
rights in California? How many scholars of any stripe immerse them-
selves in law and pedagogy at the age of nearly ninety, and do it with
verve? How many international lawyers would carry a full teaching
load in California while serving as Counselor on International Law at
the State Department in Washington, D.C.? The answer to each of
these questions is one: Steve Riesenfeld.
The image I have from my student days at Boalt is of Professor
Riesenfeld taking off his glasses in the middle of Creditors' Rights
class and bending over until his nose almost seemed to touch the po-
dium. He would then read something from his own casebook while
we in the great sea of classroom faces sat transfixed or perplexed, as
the case may have been. I was mostly perplexed. Nevertheless, I
came away knowing a bit about the subject and, more importantly,
feeling that I had spent a semester in the presence of a great man.
When I see him these days at a meeting of The American Society of
International Law, I still feel that I am in the presence of a great man.
And so he is. In areas of the law that capture his attention, he contin-
ues to provide insights in conversation and writing. Within the inter-
national law field, he is as comfortable with the law of the European
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Union or of some individual European countries as he is with the
broader law of nations or with the foreign relations law of the United
States.
Of Steve Riesenfeld's many scholarly contributions, one dealing
with U.S. foreign relations law stands out in my mind.1 It concerns the
self-executing treaty doctrine. Courts in this country have struggled
for a very long time with the concept of self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties. Although federal judges acknowledge that certain
treaty provisions could be self-executing in the sense that they could
act as federal law in the United States and be enforced in the U.S.
courts without any implementing Act of Congress, those same judges
often seem reluctant to apply treaty provisions in the absence of an
implementing federal statute. Perhaps they perceive some sort of
democratic deficit when a normative provision is asserted as judicially-
enforceable without the imprimatur of adoption by bolh Houses of
Congress. This, despite the dictate of the Supremacy Ciause (which,
as is well known, accords treaties made under the authority of the
United States the same supremacy in judicial proceedings as the Con-
stitution and federal statutes).2
Riesenfeld took exception when the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held Article 6 of the 1958 Convention of the High
Seas non-self-executing in a case involving Coast Guard confiscation
of marijuana from a Cayman Islands vessel on the high seas and sub-
sequent prosecution of the crew on drug charges. Article 6 provides
in part, "Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in
exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in
these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high
seas... . The court found that the United States, by boarding the
vessel and seizing it on the high seas, had violated Article 6, but the
violation did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Had the court held
Article 6 self-executing, it would have had difficulty getting around
Cook v. United States,' which could be read to require dismissal of a
prosecution stemming from a seizure in violation of a self-executing
treaty provision. The court in Postal pointed out that the Convention
1. Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal:
Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1980).
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
3. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
4. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.
82. Essentially the same provision appears in the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 92(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982).
5. 288 U.S. 102, 53 S. Ct. 305, 77 L. Ed. 641 (1933).
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on the High Seas is a multilateral treaty ratified by more than fifty
nations, "some of which do not recognize treaties as self-executing. It
is difficult therefore to ascribe to the language of the treaty any com-
mon intent that the treaty should of its own force operate as the do-
mestic law of the ratifying nations."6 Riesenfeld demolished this
reasoning. He pointed out that the intent of all parties was relevant
only to the question whether the treaty meant to give private parties
protection in domestic courts against prosecutions in violation of its
provisions. If so, how that protection is to be given-by the treaty
itself or only by implementing statute-is a matter of the domestic
constitutional law of each party.7
There is no apparent reason why Article 6 should not be held
self-executing in the United States. Be that as it may, Riesenfeld's
contribution deserves the attention of the courts in this country be-
cause it outlines the approach they ought to take when they are faced
with a relevant treaty provision in a criminal prosecution or even a
civil action. Riesenfeld has shown how misguided they can be, and
what they should be looking for when they try to determine whether a
particular multilateral treaty provision is self-executing or not.
Riesenfeld's critique of the Postal case is typical of his scholar-
ship. It displays a deft touch for making subtle but important distinc-
tions, without simply being academic. In fact, what he has to say is
often intensely practical. His experience as counselor to the State De-
partment must have benefited from, and contributed to, his perform-
ance as a scholar with a practical bent. Those of us who follow
international law can only be grateful to him for just that. I suspect,
but cannot say from experience, that those who follow the private law
subjects in which he is interested are equally grateful for his insights in
those areas. He has enriched the law, its students and its practitioners,
in more ways than one.
I feel privileged to have learned at his knee and still to be learn-
ing there.
6. 589 F.2d at 878.
7. Riesenfeld, supra note 1, at 895-96.
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